I
t's a lovely morning in a university classroom. Early spring sunlight streams through the windows, making the atmosphere bright and cheerful. The smell of chocolate is in the air as the students-security professionals-enthusiastically work on their task. Today is the first day of the Assurance Cases module, and the students have just been introduced to the claims, arguments, and evidence (CAE) framework, 1, 2 which is used to develop complex justifications about engineering systems. However, the systems will come later. For now, the students are applying the approach to create a convincing argument about the chocolate that they're eating.
The task is performed in groups, with two different teams working on contradictory claims: "chocolate is good for you" and "chocolate is bad for you." Both teams are positive they can demonstrate their claim's truth. The students actively collaborate to share ideas, split the claim into subclaims, search the Internet for relevant evidence and counterevidence, and develop a strong argument supporting the claim. Along the way, they become more fluent in CAE and gain some initial practical experience in creating structured argumentation.
Finally, it's time to present the results. Both teams come up with a logical structured case supported by reliable evidence, such as research studies and scientific papers, showing that their claim is true.
But how is it possible that two completely opposite claims can both be shown to be true? That's the moment when the students, interested in cloud security, grasp the exercise's purpose.
THE IMPORTANCE OF DETAIL
The chocolate example shows the students, early in the module, the importance of precision in identifying the context, environment, and all related details of a claim before reaching any conclusions: For engineering systems, asking detailed questions is paramount. The decision to trust a system-for example, to fly in an aircraft or activate a power station-can have physical, societal, environmental, and economic consequences.
Engineering arguments have many characteristics; they're multidisciplinary and science based, with mathematical models and simulations supporting the justification. Overall confidence in any aspect of the system must take into account numerous details. These range from technical considerations (for example, to prove that the software works as intended) to various social aspects (for example, whether we can trust the operators) and is always a judgement made within a particular organizational context to develop a view of the system as whole. The context, environment, system boundaries, and other specific details must be clearly defined before any claim about the system can be demonstrated or any important decision made.
The increasing frequency and severity of cybersecurity incidents and the growing sophistication of attackers bring even more challenges to the decision-making process. Numerous analyses must be performed to address security concerns in addition to the traditional techniques used to assure the system and achieve confidence in engineering decisions.
One way to justify the trustworthiness of complex systems is the assurance case, defined as "a documented body of evidence that provides a convincing and valid argument that a system is adequately dependable for a given application in a given environment."
2 Assurance cases support rigorous argumentation but aren't purely deductive-they require inductive reasoning and expert judgement to decide whether they provide sufficient confidence in the decision.
SECURITY-INFORMED ASSURANCE CASES
The Assurance Cases module we teach at City, University of London focuses on cybersecurity and is delivered within the MSc course Management of Information Security and Risk. Security analysis is often seen as a distinct activity with its own standards, regulations, culture, and engineering. However, there's a growing realization that security is closely interconnected with other properties and should be integrated into existing analyses rather than performed separately.
Toward this end, we've enhanced the existing assurance-case methodology to analyze and communicate security explicitly. 3, 4 In this way, we can consider cybersecurity aspects with other critical system properties in an integrated manner within a securityinformed assurance case.
In developing this approach, we found that a significant portion of an assurance case must be changed in the light of security considerations. 4 Incorporating security impacts the design and implementation process as well as verification and validation. Some of the most important security considerations involve system resilience and recovery, in response to malicious events that could change in nature and scope as as the threat environment evolves as well as nonmalicious issues occurring during system operation. Other key aspects include supply-chain integrity and mitigation of the risks of being provided with system components that are compromised or have egregious vulnerabilities and design changes to accommodate user interaction, training, and configuration needs. Addressing software vulnerabilities might lead to additional functional requirements for security controls and new organizational policies. Security-informed assurance cases show how the technical aspects of security fit within the broader system context, including interdependencies among components and human aspects such as security culture and practices. They provide the means to systematically explore security issues, analyze their impact, and achieve confidence in the security-related decisions made.
Combining security with a wide range of other issues is complicated,
The context, environment, system boundaries, and other specific details must be clearly defined before any claim about a system can be demonstrated or any important decision made.
and at the heart of this endeavor is a full awareness and understanding of hazards. A detailed hazard analysis must be conducted and integrated into the assurance case to become part of the overall decision-making process.
HAZOPS FOR SECURITY
A hazard and operability study (hazops) systematically identifies potential hazards and deviations from design and operating intention, and is widely used for industrial safetycritical systems. Security considerations can significantly impact a hazops given the additional risks to system integrity and availability. To bring these areas into focus, we've adapted the traditional hazops to explicitly address security and extended guideword interpretations to facilitate the identification of security-related hazards. Table 1 lists common guidewords with examples.
Prior to performing a securityinformed hazops, a simplified architecture diagram is created to capture the most relevant components and system interfaces. Each interface on the diagram is then systematically analyzed by applying the guidewords. In addition to identifying potential accidental hazards and operability problems, as in a traditional hazops, the analysis must also › identify potential attacks, › assess credible causes of an attack, › capture any questions arising about an attack, › explore the potential consequences of an attack, › make recommendations to prevent an attack or reduce its consequences, and › define any needed actions or follow-up activities.
In practice, a security-informed hazops is conducted at multidisciplinary team meetings that bring together the knowledge and expertise of people working on different parts of the system. While performing the analysis, the team explores the entire system. In our capacity as Adelard consultants, we explain the method and guide the process by facilitating discussions and capturing all input. However, the main insight is provided by the system experts; our task is to help them identify security-related hazards and incorporate them into the assurance case.
Adelard's security-informed hazops methodology is based on extensive experience. We've used it to identify and analyze security threats to many complex systems, including large-scale critical infrastructures, and to provide assurance that they're both safe and secure. This is an active research area, and it should be noted there are other related approaches to consider such as the STRIDE threat model 5 and the Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model. 6 ,7
TEACHING COMPLEX CONCEPTS
To deal with the complexity of securityinformed assurance cases, we use a pedagogical approach called spiral learning (see Figure 1) , in which basic concepts are introduced and then repeatedly revisited with more details building upon them. 8 As practitioners,
we support hands-on or experiential learning, and research confirms that students learn best by doing. [9] [10] [11] We thus introduce various activities and workshops at different stages of the spiral curriculum to ensure that Assurance Cases module participants develop both theoretical knowledge and practical skills.
To facilitate student learning, we use the well-established case-studies approach, which is an effective way to involve students in the experiential learning cycle and increase motivation and interest in the subject. [12] [13] [14] We use real-world problems to drive the case studies. The Assurance Cases modules we're conducting this year relate to cloud security. As mature security professionals, many of our students work for organizations that are either using various cloud services now or have plans to do so in the future. Beginning with the deceptively simple question of whether chocolate is good or bad for you, the modules are a useful way to explore whether cloudbased solutions are secure.
HEADS IN THE CLOUD
Cloud computing is a rapidly growing market. According to Gartner, 15 the worldwide public cloud services market is projected to be $246.8 billion in 2017. The highest growth of 36.8 percent will be in infrastructure as a service as adoption becomes mainstream. The software-as-a-service market will see slightly slower growth and is expected to increase by 20.1 percent this year. Although cloud computing can provide many benefits to organizations, such as greater business agility, scalability, flexibility, and cost optimization, information security is a major concern. With cyberattacks one of the fastest growing economic crimes, 16 companies are increasingly interested in protecting their digital data and minimizing security risks when adopting cloud solutions.
The most common claim students initially make in the Assurance Cases module is that "cloud solution A is secure." However, as with the chocolate example, such a claim is too broad and vague for meaningful analysis.
Security isn't absolute; various details relevant to a particular organizationfor example, who uses the service, what devices are used, data types, and usage patterns-must be considered before any conclusion can be made. A more specific claim would be "cloud solution A within organization B provides sufficient level of security for its staff to use for corporate data C on D devices." Starting from this claim, students would need to define "sufficient" security and identify the system boundaries, the specific context and system environment, user and organizational responsibilities and legal obligations, requirements from regulators and other stakeholders, and so on to provide a more detailed analysis.
REACHING A DECISION
Many details will emerge during a security-informed hazops. Students must fully integrate the results of their analysis into the assurance case to ensure their inclusion in the overall decision-making process.
As part of this process, students must clearly distinguish evidence from information. These two concepts are often confused by students, resulting in problems with the justification. Information broadly includes all relevant data, ranging from textual statements to statistics, but only data that specifically supports or undermines a claim constitutes evidence. In an assurance case, it needs to be explicitly clear what each piece of evidence shows and what conclusions it supports.
In addition, students learn not to confuse evidence with claims. For example, one common mistake in assurance cases is to use a service-level agreement (SLA) as evidence for achieving certain requirements. However, SLAs only provide a promise to deliver a given service; they're not actual evidence that the service has been delivered. Therefore, SLAs should only generate claims and require supporting evidence of fulfillment.
With respect to cloud security, unfortunately, students often have trouble obtaining evidence from service providers. Plenty of information is available, but evidence tends to be incomplete or restricted. Nevertheless, students still learn the important skill of determining what evidence is needed.
The cases students produce by the end of the Assurance Cases module are quite detailed. For example, for cloud security cases created by our students in this academic year, the average case contains 37 claims, 25 arguments, and 27 pieces of evidence. Students use CAE blocks 17 with some tool support 18 to structure their cases.
On average, this year's student cases contains 10 decomposition, 2 substitution, 2 concretion, and 19 evidence incorporation blocks.
R
eturning to this article's title, there's no right answer for such a generic question. It's impossible to demonstrate the truth of "chocolate is good (or bad) for you" or "the cloud is (or isn't) secure." However, there are approaches that can help you reach a decision that satisfies specific requirements within a certain context for a particular application and environment. Built on the CAE framework, assurance cases help our students refine claims, collect detailed evidence, narrow options, and structure a convincing and valid argument to justify the resulting decision.
But assurance cases have a wider impact. In their postmodule evaluations, our students report becoming more cognizant of the claims they and others make and more aware of the need to identify specific evidence, question assumptions, and analyze issues more deeply. This mindset change is precisely what's needed to meet today's increasingly complex security challenges. Creating, reviewing, and managing complex security-informed assurance cases with hazops, links to standards, and so on Tool support for constructing and managing cases Con dence in cases, linking to standards, evidence trustworthiness Architecting cases: pattern, templates, layers, dealing with complexity Hazard and operability study (hazops) analysis, STRIDE threat model, sociotechnical considerations Security-informed assurance cases, CAE with blocks Basic concepts, CAE (claims, arguments, and evidence) Figure 1 . Spiral model for teaching security-informed assurance cases, starting with basic concepts in the center and expanding outward with increasingly complex concepts and additional details.
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